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Abstract 
 
  How can groups elicit and aggregate the information held by their individual members? 
The most obvious answer involves deliberation. For two reasons, however, deliberating groups 
often fail to make good decisions. First, the statements and acts of some group members convey 
relevant information, and that information often leads other people not to disclose what they 
know. Second, social pressures, imposed by some group members, often lead other group 
members to silence themselves because of fear of disapproval and associated harms. The 
unfortunate results include the propagation of errors; hidden profiles; cascade effects; and group 
polarization. A variety of steps should be taken to ensure that deliberating groups obtain the 
information held by their members. Because of their ability to aggregate privately held 
information, information markets substantial advantages over group deliberation. These points 
bear on discussion of normative issues, in which deliberation might also fail to improve group 
thinking. 
 
 
“Increased accuracy is a common justification for using groups, rather than 
individuals, to make judgments. However, the empirical literature shows that groups 
excel as judges only under limited conditions. . . . [G]roups performing tasks that involve 
solutions that are not easily demonstrable tend to perform at the level of their average 
members.”
1
 
 “The presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs was so strong that formalized 
[Intelligence Community] mechanisms established to challenge assumptions and ‘group 
think,’ such as ‘red teams,’ ‘devil’s advocacy,’ and other types of alternative or 
competitive analysis, were not utilized.”
2
 
“Sometimes important forecasts are made in traditional group meetings. This . . . 
should be avoided because it does not use information efficiently. A structured approach 
for combining independent forecasts is invariably more accurate.”
3
 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political 
Science, University of Chicago. For valuable comments, I am grateful to Bernard Harcourt, Douglas 
Lichtman, Richard Posner, Adam Samaha, and participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the University of 
Chicago Law School. Many thanks also to Robert Park for extraordinary research assistance. Thanks above 
all to Reid Hastie, for a great deal of patient help and tutoring. 
1 See Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, 121 Psych. 
Bulletin 149 (1997). 
2 Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Report of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Conclusions, at 7. 
3 J. Scott Armstrong, Combining Forecasts, in Principle of Forecasting 417, 433 (J. Scott Armstrong ed. 
2001).   
I. Introduction 
 
In the last decades, a great deal of attention has been devoted to deliberative 
accounts of democracy. Its theoretical foundations have been elaborated in some detail,
4 
and increasing attention is being devoted to methods for making democratic processes 
more deliberative. James Fishkin, for example, has pioneered the idea of the “deliberative 
opinion poll,” by which people are asked to deliberate together on public issues and to 
state their judgments only after the deliberative process.
5 Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman 
have gone so far as to suggest a new national holiday, Deliberation Day, in which people 
are asked to congregate in groups in order to discuss and debate important issues of 
public policy.
6 Perhaps the proposal is unrealistic; perhaps citizens as a whole should not 
be expected to deliberate much in a liberal society.
7 But even if this is true, leaders in the 
public and private sphere might be urged to deliberate more than they now do, and many 
accounts of deliberative democracy emphasis the importance of deliberation by 
representatives.
8 In any case countless organizations, both public and private, use 
deliberation to make their judgments; multimember courts, including federal courts of 
appeals, are only one example. 
Why, exactly, is deliberation important or even desirable? A central answer must 
be that deliberation will result in wiser judgments and better outcomes.
9 But does 
deliberation actually have this effect? The answer is by no means clear. The idea of 
“groupthink,” coined and elaborated by Irving Janis, suggests the possibility that groups 
will tend toward uniformity and censorship, thus failing to combine information and 
enlarge the range of arguments.
10
Consider, for example, the 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, which explicitly accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of 
groupthink, in which the agency’s predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it 
                                                 
4 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1998); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement (1999). 
5 See James Fishkin, The Voice of the People (2000). 
6 See Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, Deliberation Day (2004). 
7 See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003). 
8 See William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (1996). 
9 There are other possibilities, of course. Perhaps deliberation has educative effects or contributes to 
individual self-development; perhaps it legitimates decisions or increases the likelihood that people will 
acquiesce in then. See Thomas Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1999). 
10 See Irving Janis, Groupthink (2d ed. 1980). 
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to fail to explore alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the information that it 
actually held.
11 In the Committee’s view, the CIA “demonstrated several aspects of group 
think: examining few alternatives, selective gathering of information, pressure to conform 
within the group or withhold criticism, and collective rationalization.”
12 Thus the agency 
showed a “tendency to reject information that contradicted the presumption” that Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction.
13 Because of that presumption, the agency failed to use its 
own formalized methods “to challenge assumptions and ‘group think,’ such as ‘red 
teams,’ ‘devil’s advocacy,’ and other types of alternative or competitive analysis.”
14 
Above all, the Committee’s conclusions emphasize the CIA’s failure to elicit and 
aggregate information. 
This claim is a remarkable and even uncanny echo of one that followed the 2003 
investigation of failures at NASA, stressing that agency’s similar failure to elicit 
competing views, including those based on information held by agency employees.
15 The 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board explicitly attributed the accident to NASA's 
unfortunate culture, one that does too little to elicit information. In the Board's words, 
NASA lacks "checks and balances."
16 It pressures people to follow a "party line."
17 At 
NASA, "it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to percolate up through the 
agency's hierarchy"
18—even though, the Board contended, effective safety programs 
require the encouragement of minority opinions and bad news.  
One of my major goals here is to explore the consequences of two systematic 
sources of problems with deliberation, political and otherwise.
19 The first consists of 
informational influences, by which group members fail to disclose what they know 
because of deference to the information announced by others. The second involves social 
pressures, which lead people to silence themselves in order not to face reputational 
                                                 
11 Available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/.  
12 Id., conclusions at 4. 
13 Id. at 6. 
14 Id. at 8. 
15 Report of The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, available at 
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html 
16 Id. at 12.  
17 Id. at 102. 
18 Id. at 183. 
19 I explore these mechanisms from a different direction in Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 
(2003), but without attention to statistical groups and information markets, and without focusing on 
propagation of errors, hidden profiles, and the common knowledge effect, which are major emphases here. 
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sanctions, such as the disapproval of relevant others. As a result of these problems, 
groups often propagate individual errors; emphasize shared information at the expense of 
unshared information; fall victim to cascade effects; and tend to end up in a more extreme 
position in light with the predeliberation tendencies of their members.
20  
Each of these problems suggest that deliberative processes will often fail to 
achieve their minimal goal of aggregating the information that the relevant deliberators 
actually have. To keep the analysis simple, my principal focus is not on contested 
judgments of value but on questions with objectively correct answers. An understanding 
of how deliberation finds, and fails to find, those answers should have implications for its 
potential and limitations with respect to normative questions as well. The solution to 
many such questions depends at least in part on answers to questions of fact; it is difficult 
to take a stand on proposals to raise the minimum wage, to engage in preemptive war, or 
to overrule Roe v. Wade
21 without resolving several issues of fact. And even when factual 
issues are not central, deliberation can, in principle, ensure more sensible judgments.
22 
Unfortunately, however, the problems posed by informational pressure and social 
influences apply in normative domains as well as elsewhere. 
 This Article comes in four parts. Part II explores a nondeliberative method for 
aggregating privately-held information, one that simply takes the average of 
predeliberation judgments. The resulting judgments of these “statistical groups” are 
sometimes remarkably accurate, and they provide a useful benchmark for assessing 
deliberative judgments.
23 An understanding of the judgments of statistical groups also 
provides several clues about the usefulness and limitations of relying on the judgments of 
groups in general. Part III explores the effects of informational pressures and social 
influences, with an emphasis on propagation of errors, hidden profiles, cascade effects, 
and group polarization. Part III also attempts to square some apparently conflicting 
evidence about the performance of deliberating groups; it investigates the possibility that 
some groups will do as well as or even better than their best members.  
                                                 
20 This last possibility is emphasized in Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (1985); 
Sunstein, supra note. 
21 410 US 113 (1973). 
22 This is the thesis of Fishkin, The Voice of the People, supra note. 
23 These are often described as the judgments of “statisticized groups.” See Irving Lorge et al., A Survey of 
Studies Contrasting the Quality of Group Performance and Individual Performance, 1920-1957, 55 Psych 
Bull 337, 344 (1958). 
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Part IV investigates reforms that are intended to ensure that group members reveal 
what they know—for example, by requiring anonymous statements of beliefs before 
deliberation begins, by structuring incentives to produce disclosure of privately held 
information, and by assigning specified roles to participants in deliberation. Part V 
identifies and compares a novel method for aggregating individual judgments: 
“information markets,” in which people bet on the outcomes of events. Information 
markets have performed remarkably well, and in many ways they have advantages over 
both statistical judgments and deliberative judgments. They might well be used as a 
supplement to or even a replacement for collective deliberation. Part VI briefly discusses 
how the analysis might apply to normative questions. 
  
II. Statistical  Groups 
 
Suppose that there is a question about some disputed issue of fact. How many 
home runs did Hank Aaron hit? When was Calvin Coolidge elected president? Will a 
district court decision be reversed on appeal? Does a foreign country pose a serious threat 
to national security? Is the United States likely to have difficulty in winning a particular 
war? A great deal of evidence suggests that under certain conditions, a promising way to 
answer such questions is this: Ask a large number of people and take the mean answer. 
When the relevant conditions are met, the mean answer, which we might describe as the 
group’s “statistical answer,”
24 is often accurate, where accuracy is measured by reference 
to objectively demonstrable fact.  
It is well-known that statistical answers from groups of sufficiently large sizes 
tend to match the views of population-wide samples.
25 This finding bears on issues as 
diverse as the use of juries as a measure of community sentiment
26 and the remarkable 
success of Google, the search engine; Google is good at finding what a particular 
searcher wants because it knows what most searchers want.
27 But here the question is 
                                                 
24 See Janis, supra note.  
25 See H.J. Eysenck, The Validity of Judgments As A Function of Number of Judges, 25 J. Exp Psych. 650 
(1939). 
26 For evidence and comments, see Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing 
Punitive Damages, 107 Yale L.J. 2071 (1998). 
27 See Sergey Brin and Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 
available at http://www-db.stanford.edu/ 
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what is true, not what populations think. Let us therefore explore how statistical groups 
perform, partly because the answer is important and illuminating itself, and partly 
because it provides a useful foundation for the assessment of both deliberating groups 
and their limitations.  
 
A. Evidence 
 
Many of the studies of statistical groups involve quantitative estimates. Consider a 
few examples:  
 
1. In an early study, Hazel Knight asked college students to estimate the 
temperature of a classroom.
28 Individual judgments ranged from 60 degrees to 
eighty-five degrees; the statistical judgment of the group was 72.4 degrees, 
very close to the actual temperature of 72 degrees. That judgment was better 
than that of 80% of individual judgments.  
2.  Judging the numbers of beans in the jar, the group average is almost always 
better than that of the vast majority of individual members. In one such 
experiment, a group of fifty-six students was asked about a jar containing 850 
beans; the group estimate was 871, a better guess than all but one of 
students.
29  
3.  Asking two hundred students to rank items by weight, one experimenter found 
that the group’s estimate was 94 percent accurate—a figure excelled by only 
five individuals.
30  
4.  Asked to rank ten piles of buckshot, each only slightly different in size from 
the others, the group’s guess was 94.5% accurate, far more so than that of 
almost all group members.
31  
5.  The British scientist Francis Galton sought to draw lessons about collective 
intelligence by examining a competition in which contestants attempted to 
                                                 
28 Id. at 342. 
29 See James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds 5 (2004). 
30 Kate Gordon, Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights, 7 J Exp Psych 389 (1924); Kate Gordon, 
Further Observations on Group Judgments of Lifted Weights, 1 J Psych 105 (1935-1936). 
31 R.S Bruce, Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights and Visual Discrimination, 1 J Psych 117 
(1935-1936). 
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judge the weight of a fat ox at a regional fair in England. The ox weighed 
1,198 pounds; the average guess, from the 797 contestants, was 1,197 
pounds.
32  
 
If these findings can be generalized, many questions might plausibly be answered 
not deliberatively, but simply by asking a large group of people and selecting the average 
response. Imagine that a large company is attempting to project its sales for the following 
year. Might it do best to poll its salespeople and to choose the average number on the 
assumption that it is likely to be correct
33? Or suppose that a company is deciding 
whether to hire a new employee. Should it ask relevant personnel whether the employee’s 
performance is likely to meet a certain level? Or suppose that the question is whether a 
case should be settled. Ought a law firm to poll its lawyers about the expected outcome at 
trial? Or suppose the question is whether a war effort will go well by some identifiable 
standard. Should the President poll his advisers and take the median answer? To answer 
these questions, we have to know why, in the relevant studies, the median judgment is so 
accurate. 
 
B. The Condorcet Jury Theorem 
 
The accuracy of judgments of statistical groups is best explained by reference to 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
34 To see how the Theorem works, suppose that people are 
answering a common question with two possible answers, one false and one true, and that 
the average probability that each voter will answer correctly exceeds 50 percent. The Jury 
Theorem holds that the probability of a correct answer, by a majority of the group, 
increases toward certainty as the size of the group increases.
35 The importance of the Jury 
Theorem lies in the demonstration that groups are likely to do better than individuals, and 
large groups better than small ones, if majority rule is used and if each person is more 
                                                 
32 See James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (2004). 
33 Some affirmative evidence can be found in J. Scott Armstrong, Combining Forecasts, in Principle of 
Forecasting 417, 433 (J. Scott Armstrong ed. 2001). 
34 See William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group Judgment: Error in the 
Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J Risk and Uncertainty 147 (2002). 
35 The theorem is based on some simple arithmetic. Suppose, for example, that there is a three person 
group, in which each member has a 67% probability of bring right. The probability that a majority vote will 
produce the correct answer is 74%. 
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likely than not to be correct. The last proviso is extremely important. Suppose that each 
individual in a group is more likely to be wrong than right. If so, the likelihood that the 
group will decide correctly falls to zero as the size of the group increases.  
In the context of statistical judgments, several of Condorcet’s stringent and 
somewhat unrealistic assumptions are met. Indeed, the likelihood that they will be met is 
higher with statistical groups than with deliberating ones. Condorcet assumed that people 
would be unaffected by whether their votes would be decisive
36; that people would not be 
affected by one another’s votes; and that the probability that one group member would be 
right would be statistically unrelated to the probability that another group member would 
be right.
37 The first two assumptions plainly hold for statistical groups. People do not 
know what others are saying and hence they cannot be influenced by a belief that their 
judgments will make the difference to that of the group. The third assumption may or 
may not be violated. Those who have similar training, or who work closely together, will 
be likely to see things in the same way,
38 and those involved in statistical groups might 
well meet these conditions. On the other hand, the Condorcet Jury Theorem has been 
shown to be robust to violations of this third assumption.
39
To see why statistical groups perform well, consider the problems just described 
and note that even if everyone in the group is not more than 50% likely to be right, the 
Theorem’s predictions may continue to hold. Suppose, for example, that 60% of people 
are 51% likely to be right and that 40% of people are 50% likely to be right; or that 45% 
of people are 40% likely to be right and that 55% of people are 65% likely to be right; or 
even that 51% of people are 51% likely to be right and that 49% of people are merely 
50% likely to be right. Even under these conditions, the likelihood of a correct answer 
will move toward 100% as the size of the group increases. It will not move as quickly as 
it would if every group member were highly likely to be right, but it will nonetheless 
move. We could imagine endless variations on these numbers. The point is that even if a 
significant percentage of the group is not more likely to be right than wrong, or even if 
                                                 
36 Bloom et al., supra note, at 153. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group Judgment: Error in the 
Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J Risk and Uncertainty 147 (2002). 
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many group members are more likely to be wrong than right, an accurate result, from a 
sufficiently large group, can be expected.  
Of course most of the relevant judgments, in studies of statisticized groups, do not 
involve a binary choice; consider the question how many beans are in a jar, how many 
pounds a given object weighs, or how well a certain product will sell in the following 
year. But the answers to such questions are not analytically different from those in binary 
choices. In answering the relevant questions, each person is effectively being asked to 
answer a long series of binary questions—ten beans or a thousand beans, twenty beans or 
five hundred beans, fifty beans or one hundred beans, and so on. If a sufficiently large 
group is asked to answer such questions, and if most individual answers will be correct, 
the mean answer will be highly accurate. Of course the combination of probabilities, for a 
series of binary results, might mean that things will turn out poorly. If someone is 51% 
likely to answer each of two questions correctly, the probability that she will answer both 
questions correctly is only around 25%. But with large groups, enough people are likely 
to make good guesses, on the questions involved in certain quantitative judgments, that 
the average estimate will have a high degree of accuracy. 
But compare a situation in which if only 49% of the group is likely to be correct. 
If so, the likelihood of a mistake will move toward 100% under the same condition. But 
for the number of beans in a jar, or the weight of an ox, most people are not wholly at 
sea. The accuracy of the median judgment, for large groups, is simply an application of 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem. And in certain circumstances, deliberating groups will act 
in roughly the same way, aggregating their information to produce remarkably accurate 
results.
40
 
C. Errors 
 
In this light, we can identify two situations in which the judgment of a statistical 
group will be incorrect. The first are those in which group members show a systematic 
bias. The second are those in which their answers are worse than random. The failures of 
statistical judgments, in these circumstances, have strong implications for deliberation as 
well. 
                                                 
40 Id. 
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1. Bias. A systematic bias in one or another direction will create serious problems 
for the group’s answers. If, for example, an experimenter “anchors” subjects on a 
misleading number, the median will almost certainly be wrong. Suppose, for example, 
that a jar contains 800 jelly beans, and the experimenter happens to say, quietly, “many 
jars of jelly beans, though not necessarily this one, have 500 jelly beans,” or even, “I’m 
asking this question to 250 people.”
41 In either case, the low number will likely operate as 
an anchor,
42 and people’s answers will be systematically biased toward understating the 
actual number, producing an unreliable mean. One study demonstrates more generally 
that a group’s statistical estimate is likely to be erroneous “when the material is 
unfamiliar, distorted in a way such that all individuals are prone to make similar errors of 
estimation.”
43 The error-producing effects of anchors are simply a special case of this 
general point. 
2. Random or worse. Suppose that people are asked not about the number of jelly 
beans in a jar, but about the number of atoms in a jelly bean. On that question, people’s 
answers are hopelessly ill-informed, and there is no reason at all to trust their judgments. 
Consider a small-scale study at the University of Chicago Law School, one that strongly 
supports this conclusion. A number of faculty members were asked the weight, in 
pounds, of the fuel that powers space shuttles. The actual answer is 4 million pounds. The 
median response was 200,000; the mean was 55,790,555 (because of one outlier 
choice)—both wildly inaccurate. In a binary choice, of course, people’s answers will be 
worse than random only if they are unaware of how little they know; if they know that 
they are likely to be wrong, they should choose randomly, which gives them a 50% 
probability of being right. But sometimes people think they know more than they do, and 
many tasks do not involve binary choices at all. Statistical groups will err if confusion 
and ignorance are so widespread that individual’s answers are worse than random. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Even self-evidently arbitrary anchors have significant effects on people’s judgments. See Gretchen 
Chapman and Eric Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in 
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 120 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002). 
42 See id. 
43 Lorge et al., supra note, at 346. 
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D. Statistical Answers and Experts 
 
Might statistical means be used more than they now are? Do statistical means 
outperform experts? Everything depends on the competence of the experts. If we could 
find real experts on the weight of oxen or on how to count jelly beans, and if we define 
expertise as the ability to make assessments with almost no margin of errors, then they 
might well do better than statistical means. Suppose, for example, that a deliberating 
group of lawyers is trying to decide how many Supreme Court decisions have invalidated 
a state or federal law, or the number of lines in Antigone, or the weight of the most recent 
winner of the Kentucky Derby. Would it make any sense to poll the lawyers individually 
and to assume that the mean response is accurate?  The studies outlined above suggest 
that if the group is large enough, the mean answer will be at least good.
44 But there are 
many ways to do far better.  
For many factual questions, of course, a little research would be sufficient to 
identify the correct answers. But for some factual issues, even significant research is 
inconclusive, and it is best to consult experts. And if experts are available, it would make 
sense to obtain a statistical answer from them, rather than to select one or a few. If 
experts are likely to be right, a statistical group of experts should have the same 
advantage over individuals as a statistical group of ordinary people has over ordinary 
individuals. In fact a great deal of evidence supports this claim.
45 In a series of thirty 
comparisons, statistical groups of experts had 12.5% fewer errors on forecasting tasks 
involving such diverse issues as company earnings, cattle and chicken prices, real and 
nominal GNP, survival of patients, and housing starts.
46 For example, statistical groups of 
experts significantly outperformed individual experts in predicting the annual earnings of 
firms; changes in the American economy; and annual peek rainfall runoff in eight 
different countries.
47 The implication is straightforward: “Organizations often call on the 
                                                 
44 I conducted such a poll with faculty at the University of Chicago Law School, who did fairly well in 
estimating the weight of the horse who won the Kentucky Derby, fairly badly in estimating the number of 
lines in Antigone—and horrendously with the number of Supreme Court invalidations of state and federal 
law! 
45 See J. Scott Armstrong, Combining Forecasts, in Principles of Forecasting 416 (2001). 
46 Id. at 428. 
47 Id. at 430-31. 
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best expert they can find to make important forecasts. They should avoid this practice, 
and instead combine forecasts from a number of experts.”
48
Consider in this regard the Copenhagen Consensus, designed to inform policy 
judgments about global risks.
49 The Copenhagen Consensus was obtained for a series of 
possible interventions, involving climate change, water and sanitation, hunger and 
malnutrition, free trade, and communicable diseases, among others. A number of experts 
were asked about the best way to promote global welfare, and particularly the welfare of 
developing countries, assuming that $50 billion were made available. The experts ranked 
the possible projects, producing an overall ranking (reflecting the mean rankings of the 
experts taken as a whole).
50 I do not mean to suggest that the results of this particular 
exercise are correct; everything depends on whether the relevant experts were in a 
position to offer reliable answers on the questions at hand. But if statistical means are a 
good way to aggregate knowledge when ordinary people know something of relevance, 
then they are also a good way to aggregate knowledge from experts. 
  
III. Deliberating Groups 
 
Although the judgments of statistical groups can be quite accurate, it is easy to 
imagine that a deliberating group would be much better. In principle, a deliberating group 
should do well even when its members are error-prone. Deliberation, in the form of an 
exchange of information and reasons, might well bring them into line. If individual 
members have anchored on a misleading value, perhaps deliberation will expose the 
anchor as such. If many group members give answers that are worse than random, 
perhaps other group members can show them how they have erred. 
To make the analysis tractable, let us focus on how deliberating groups might be 
able to solve factual questions or cognitive puzzles that have correct solutions. The latter 
are often questions of instrumental rationality, posing a question about the right strategy 
for achieving agreed-upon goals.  
 
                                                 
48 Id. at 433. 
49 See http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/. 
50 See id. 
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A.  Mechanisms and Realities 
 
If groups perform better than their average member, we can imagine three 
principal mechanisms by which the improvement occurs.  
 
   Groups as equivalent to their best members. One or more group members will 
often know the right answer, and other group members might well become 
convinced of this fact. For this reason groups might perform toward or at the level 
of their best members. If some or many members suffer from ignorance, or from 
some form of bias that leads to error, other group members might correct them. 
Suppose, for example, that a panel of judges is trying to recall relevant Supreme 
Court decisions in a somewhat specialized area. If one of the judges is actually 
aware of those decisions, the group will be made aware of them too. Or suppose 
that a group of military officials is attempting to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of a potential enemy in some part of the world. If one of them is a 
specialist, all of them can learn what the specialist knows. Many deliberating 
groups contain at least one expert on the question at hand; if group members listen 
to the expert, they will do at least as well as she does. 
   The whole as the sum of the parts: aggregating information. Deliberation could 
aggregate existing information, in a way that leads the group as a whole to know 
more than any individual member does. Suppose that the group contains no 
experts on the question at issue, but that relevant information is dispersed among 
group members, so that the group is potentially expert even if its members are not. 
Deliberation might elicit the relevant information and allow the group to make a 
sensible judgment. Almost everyone has had the experience of being a part of a 
group that ended up with a solution that went beyond what any individual 
member could have produced on her own. In this process, the whole is equal to 
the sum of the parts—and the sum of the parts is what is sought.  
   Beyond the sum of the parts: synergy. The give-and-take of group discussion 
might sift information and perspectives in a way that leads the group to a good 
solution to a problem, one in which the whole is actually more than the sum of 
their parts. In such cases, deliberation is, at the very least, an ambitious form of 
13  
information aggregation, one in which the exchange of views leads to a creative 
answer or solution. And in fact, groups sometimes do outperform their best 
members.
51 
To what extent do these mechanisms work in practice? Two points are entirely 
clear. First, deliberation usually reduces variance.
52 After talking with together, group 
members tend to come into accord with one another.
53 Statistical groups thus show far 
more diversity of opinion than deliberating groups. Second, group members tend to 
become far more confident of their judgments after they speak with one another.
 54 A 
significant effect of group interactions is a greater sense that one’s post-deliberation 
conclusion is correct—whether or not those interactions actually increase accuracy. After 
people have deliberated with one another, they are highly likely to have a heightened 
sense that their view is right. Corroboration by others increases confidence in one’s 
judgments.
55 It follows that that members of deliberating groups will usually converge on 
a position on which group members have a great deal of confidence. This is not 
disturbing if that position is also likely to be correct—but if it is not, then many group 
members will end up sharing a view in which they firmly believe, but which turns out to 
be inaccurate. 
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that deliberating groups will usually 
perform well. With respect to questions with definite answers, deliberating groups tend to 
do about as well as or slightly better than their average member, but not as well as their 
best members.
56 Hence it is false to say that group members usually end up deferring to 
their internal specialists. No significant differences are found between deliberating 
groups and average individual performances in numerical estimates, such as assessment 
                                                 
51 See Gigone and Hastie, supra note. 
52 See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 206-07 (1985). 
53 Id.  
54 See Chip Heath and Rich Gonzalez, Interaction With Others Increases Decision Confidence But Not 
Decision Quality: Evidence against Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision Making, 61 Org 
Behavior and Human Decision processes 305 (1995). 
55 See Robert Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J Experimental Soc. Psych. 537 
(1996). 
56 See Gigone and Hastie, supra note; Reid Hastie, Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in 
Information Pooling and Group Decision Making 129 (Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen et al. eds. 
1983).  
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of the number of beans in a jar or the length of lines.
57 One study finds that when asked to 
estimate the populations of American cities, groups did as well as their most accurate 
individual member
58; but this is an atypical result.
59 Another study attempted to test 
whether deliberating groups were particularly good at telling whether people were telling 
the truth of instead lying.
60 The individual votes, predeliberation, were 48 percent correct, 
about the same as the post-deliberation judgments. Approximately the same number of 
people shifted toward error as toward correct answers. 
 In general, simple majority schemes do fairly well at predicting group judgments 
for many decision tasks. It follows that if the majority is wrong, the group will be wrong 
as well.
61 With experts, the same general conclusion holds. A “structured approach for 
combining independent forecasts is invariably more accurate” than “traditional group 
meetings,” which do “not use information efficiently.”
62
Let us discuss the key sources of deliberative failure, understood as a failure to 
make good decisions on the basis of the information that group members actually have. 
 
B. Two Sources of Deliberative Failure: Informational Influences and Social 
Pressures  
 
A primary advantage of statistical groups is that members say what they think. 
But with deliberating groups, this might not happen. Exposure to the views of others 
might lead people to silence themselves, and for two different reasons.  
The first reason involves the informational signals provided by the acts and views 
of other people. If most group members believe that X is true, there is reason to believe 
that X is in fact true; and that reason might outweigh the purely private reason that a 
particular group member has to believe that X is false. When other group members share 
a particular belief, isolated or minority members might not speak out, deferring to the 
                                                 
57 Id. at 133.  
58 Hillel Einhorn et al., Quality of Group Judgment, 84 Psych Bulletin 158 (1977). 
59 See Hastie, supra note. 
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informational signal given by the statements of others.
63 Not surprisingly, the strength of 
the signal will depend on the number and nature of the people who are giving it. People 
are particularly averse to being the sole dissenter. If all but one person in a deliberating 
group has said that X is true, then the remaining member is likely to agree that X is true, 
even to the point of ignoring the evidence of his own senses.
64 And if the group contains 
one or more people who are well-known to be authorities, then other group members are 
likely to defer to them.
65
Informational signals come in three different forms. First, group members might 
purchase certain products, visit particular places, or engage in certain actions; their 
conduct will provide a signal about their beliefs. Second, group members might express 
their conclusions about some issue. They might say that global warming is a serious 
problem, that crime is rising in New York City, that minimum wage legislation increases 
unemployment. Third, group members might give reasons and arguments for their 
beliefs, going beyond conclusions to explain why they think as they do. If a number of 
different arguments favor a certain conclusion, and if each of these arguments is 
plausible, there is more reason to think that the conclusion is right. Acts, conclusions, and 
reasons will have different effects in different circumstances; we can imagine a group 
whose members are unimpressed by conclusions but much affected by behavior, or a 
group whose members pay far more attention to reasons than to conclusions.
66 By 
definition, the deliberative ideal is supposed to include reason-giving, not merely actions 
or statements of conclusions. 
The second reason involves social influences. If people fear that their statements 
will be disliked or ridiculed, they might not speak, even on questions of fact. Their 
silence might stem not from a belief that they are wrong, as in the case of informational 
pressure, but instead but from the risk of social sanctions of various sorts. In the most 
extreme cases, those sanctions will take the form of criminal punishment or complete 
exclusion from the group. In less severe cases, those who defy the dominant position 
                                                 
63 Cf. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search, 108 
Econ. J. 60, 61 (1998). 
64 See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal 
13 (Elliott Aronson ed.) (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1995). 
65 See David Krech et al., Individual in Society 514 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962) 
66 For relevant data, see Gene Rowe and George Wright, Experts Opinions in Forecasting: The Role of the 
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within the group will incur a form of disapproval that will lead them to be less trusted, 
liked, and respected in the future. Here too people are inevitably affected by the number 
and nature of those with the majority position. A large majority will impose more social 
pressure than a small one. If certain group members are leaders or authorities, willing and 
able to impose social sanctions of various sorts, others will be unlikely to defy them 
publicly. 
Both informational pressure and social influences help explain the finding that in 
a deliberating group, those with a minority position often silence themselves or otherwise 
have disproportionately little weight.
67 There is a more particular finding: Members of 
low status groups—less educated people, African-Americans, sometimes women—carry 
less influence within deliberating groups than their higher-status peers.
68 The unfortunate 
result can be a loss of information to the group as a whole, in a way that ensures that 
deliberating groups do far less well than they would if only they could aggregate the 
information held by group members.  
Informational pressure and social pressures also help explain some otherwise 
puzzling findings about judicial voting on federal courts of appeals. Consider the fact that 
on three-judge panels, Republican appointees show far more conservative voting patterns 
when sitting with two other Republican appointees—and that Democratic appointees 
show far more liberal voting patterns when sitting with two other Democratic 
appointees.
69 Consider too the finding that when sitting with two Republican appointees, 
Democratic appointees show quite conservative voting patterns, close to those of 
Republican appointees in the aggregate data—and that when sitting with two Democratic 
appointees, Republican appointees are fairly liberal, with overall votes akin to those of 
Democratic appointees.
70 Informational pressure and social influences are not the whole 
story, but they play a substantial role.
71
                                                 
67 See Glenn Loury, Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of “Political Correctness” and Related 
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More generally, a comprehensive study demonstrates that majority pressures can 
be powerful even for factual questions on which some people know the right answer.
72 
Both informational pressure and social influences help account for the power of those 
influences. The study involved 1200 people, forming groups of six, five, and four 
members. Individuals were asked true-false questions, involving art, poetry, public 
opinion, geography, economics, and politics. They were then asked to assemble into 
groups, which discussed the questions and produced answers. The majority played a 
substantial role in determining the group’s answers. The truth played a role too, but a 
lesser one. If a majority of individuals on the group gave the right answer, the group’s 
majority moved toward the majority in 79 percent of the cases. If a majority of 
individuals on the group gave the wrong answer, the group decision nonetheless moved 
toward the majority in 56 percent of the cases. Hence the truth did have an influence—79 
percent is higher than 56 percent—but the majority’s judgment was the dominant one. 
And because the majority was influential even when wrong, the average group decision 
was right only slightly more often than the average individual decision (66 percent vs. 62 
percent). What is important is that groups did not take perform as well as they would 
have if they had properly aggregated the information that group members had. 
Informational influences and social pressures lead to four kinds of failures on the 
part of deliberating groups. Each has a distinctive structure; I discuss them in sequence. 
 
C. Deliberative Failure, 1: Amplification of Cognitive Errors 
 
  It is well-known that individuals do not always process information well. They 
use heuristics that lead them to predictable errors; they are also subject to identifiable 
biases, which are also productive of errors.
73 A large literature now explores the role of 
these heuristics and biases
74 and their relationship to law and policy.
75 For example, 
people follow the representativeness heuristic, in accordance with which judgments of 
probability are influenced by assessments of resemblance (the extent to which A “looks 
                                                 
72 R.L. Thorndike, The Effect of Discussion Upon the Correctness of Group Decisions, When the Factor of 
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like” B).
76 The representative heuristic helps explain what Paul Rozin and Carol 
Nemeroff call “sympathetic magical thinking,” including the beliefs that some objects 
have contagious properties and that causes resemble their effects.
77 People also err 
because they use the availability heuristic to answer difficult questions about probability. 
When people use this heuristic, they answer a question of probability by asking whether 
examples come readily to mind.
78 People are also subject to framing effects, making 
different decisions depending on the wording of the problem. For a simple example, 
consider the question whether to undergo a risky medical procedure. When people are 
told, “Of those who have this procedure, 90 percent are alive after five years,” they are 
far more likely to agree to the procedure than when they are told, “Of those who have this 
procedure, 10 percent are dead after five years.”
79  
For purposes of assessing deliberation, a central question is whether groups avoid 
the errors of the individuals who compose them. There is no clear evidence that they do, 
and there is considerable evidence that they do not—a clear illustration of the principle, 
“garbage in, garbage out,” in a way that mocks the aspiration to collective correction of 
individual blunders. In fact individual errors are not merely replicated but actually 
amplified in group decisions. 
  Consider some key findings. Groups have been found to amplify, rather than to 
attenuate, reliance on the representativeness heuristic
80; to reflect even larger framing 
effects
81; to show more overconfidence than individuals
82; to be more affected by the 
biasing effect of spurious arguments from lawyers
83; to be more susceptible to the “sunk 
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cost fallacy”
84; to be more subject to choice-rank preference reversals
85; and to make 
more, rather than fewer, conjunction errors than individuals when individual error rates 
were high (though fewer when individual error rates were low).
86 In addition, groups 
demonstrate essentially the same level of reliance on the availability heuristic, even when 
use of that heuristic leads to clear errors.
87
  Why are cognitive errors propagated and often amplified at the group level? 
Informational pressures and social influences are unquestionably at work. Suppose, for 
example, that most members of a group are prone to make conjunction errors (believing 
that A and B are more likely to be true than A alone).
88 If the majority makes conjunction 
errors, then most people will see conjunction errors, and what they see will convey 
information about what is right. Those who are not specialists in logic are likely to think: 
If most people make conjunction errors, perhaps they are not errors at all. Of course some 
people will not fall prey to those errors and may even correct them; but group members 
would have to have a high degree of confidence to do so. With respect to conjunction 
errors, groups make more errors than individuals when the rate of individual error is 
high
89—a finding that fits well with the informational explanation of why group amplify 
errors. Social influences undoubtedly contribute to the propagation and amplification of 
individual mistakes. If most group members make conjunction errors, others might make 
them too simply in order not to seem disagreeable or foolish—at least if there is no 
particular incentive to produce the right answer.   
To be sure, there is some evidence of group attenuation of biases. For example, 
groups are slightly less susceptible to hindsight bias.
90 Apparently members who are not 
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susceptible to that bias are able to persuade others that it is indeed a bias. Groups are 
especially likely to outperform the average individual when members are subject to 
“egocentric biases.”
91 When asked what percentage of other undergraduates will vote for 
George W. Bush, have cell phones, watch television on Tuesday night, enjoy a particular 
singer, or believe that Spiderman 2 will win at least one Oscar, most people show a bias 
in the direction that they themselves favor. They believe that their tastes and preferences 
are typical. But in groups with diverse views, individual members learn that their own 
position is not universally held, and hence the bias is reduced.
92 Group deliberations 
supply an important corrective.  
But the more general point is that with group discussion, individual errors are 
usually propagated, not eliminated,
93 and amplification of mistakes is at least as likely as 
alleviation. A general review suggests that when individuals show a high degree of bias, 
groups are likely to be more biased, not less biased, than their median or average 
member; in such circumstances, “groups generally can be expected to amplify rather than 
correct individual bias.”
94 This point can be seen to be an application of the lesson, from 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that as the size of the group expands, the likelihood of 
group error expands toward 100% if each group member is more likely to be wrong than 
right. What I emphasizing here is that social dynamics can aggravate rather than reduce 
that problem. 
 
D. Deliberative Failure, 2: Hidden Profiles and Common Knowledge 
 
Suppose that group members have a great deal of information—enough to 
produce the right outcome if the information is properly aggregated. Even if this is so, an 
obvious problem is that groups will not perform well if they emphasize shared 
information and slight information that is held by one or a few members. Unfortunately, 
many studies demonstrate that this is a serious possibility. “Hidden profiles” is the term 
for accurate understandings that groups could but do not obtain. Hidden profiles are in 
                                                 
91 Personal communication, Reid Hastie, University of Chicago Business School, who has conducted 
experiments on this issue for many years. 
92 Id. 
93 See Bottom et al., supra note. 
94 Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality, in Judgments, Decisions, and Public 
Policy (M.V. Gowda and Jeffrey Fox eds. 2002). 
21  
turn a product of the common knowledge effect, through which information held by all 
group members has more influence on group judgments than information held by only a 
few members.
95 The most obvious explanation of the effect is the simple fact that as a 
statistical matter, common knowledge is more likely to be communicated to the group; 
but social influences play a role as well. 
 
1. Examples. Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both face-
to-face and online.
96 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might collaborate to 
make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying for a marketing 
manager position, were placed before group members. The attributes of the candidates 
were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was clearly the best for the job 
described. Packets of information were given to subjects, each containing a subset of 
information from the resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant 
information. The groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some 
operating on-line. Almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously 
the right choice. The reason is simple: They failed to share information in a way that 
would permit the group to make that choice. Members tended to share positive 
information about the winning candidate and negative information about the losers. They 
suppressed negative information about the winner and positive information about the 
losers. Hence their statements served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus 
rather than add complications and fuel debate.”
97
Or consider a simulation of political causes, in which information was parceled 
out to individual members about three candidates for political office, and in which 
properly pooled information could have led to what was clearly the best choice.
98 In one 
condition, each member of the four-person groups was given most of the relevant 
information (66% of the information about each candidate). In that condition, 67% of 
                                                 
95 Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and Group 
Judgments, 65 J Personality and Social Psych 959 (1993). 
96 See R. Hightower and L. Sayeed, The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication Systems on Biased 
Group Discussion, 11 Computers in Human Behavior 33 (1995). 
97 Patricia Wallace, The Psychology of the Internet 82 (1999). 
98 See Garold Stasser and William Titus, Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making: 
Biased Information Sampling During Discussion, 48 J Per and Social Psych 1467 (1985). 
22  
group members favored Candidate A before discussion, and 85% after discussion.
99 This 
is clear example of appropriate aggregation of information. Groups significantly 
outperformed individuals, apparently because of the exchange of information and 
reasons. Here, then, is a clear illustration of the possibility that groups can aggregate what 
members know, in a way that produces sensible outcomes. 
In the second condition, by contrast, the information that favored Candidate A 
was parceled out to various members of the group, so that only 33% of information about 
each candidate was shared, and 67% was unshared. As the condition was designed, the 
shared information favored unambiguously inferior candidates, B and C; but if the 
unshared information emerged through discussion, and was taken seriously, Candidate A 
would be chosen. In that condition, less than 25% of group members favored Candidate 
A before discussion, a natural product of the initial distribution of information. But (and 
this is the key result) that number actually fell after discussion, simply because the shared 
information had disproportionate influence on group members.
100 In other words, groups 
did worse, not better, than individuals when information was distributed selectively. In 
those conditions, the commonly held information was far more influential than the 
distributed information, to the detriment of the group’s ultimate decision.  
From this and many similar studies, the general conclusion is that when “the 
balance of unshared information opposes the initial most popular position . . . the 
unshared information will tend to be omitted from discussion and, therefore, will have 
little effect on members’ preferences during group discussion.”
101 It follows that “[g]roup 
decisions and postgroup preferences reflect[] the initial preferences of group members 
even when the exchange of unshared information should have resulted in substantial 
shifts in opinion.”
102 Nor does discussion increase the recall of unshared information. On 
the contrary, its major effect is to increase recall of the attributes of the initially most 
popular candidate.
103 The most disturbing conclusion is that groups are “more likely to 
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endorse an inferior option after discussion than” are “their individual members before 
discussion.”
104
2.  The common knowledge effect. These results are best understood as a 
consequence of the “common knowledge effect,” by which information held by all group 
members has the most substantial influence on group judgments, far more than 
information held by one member or a few.
105 More precisely, the “influence of a 
particular item of information is directly and positively related to the number of group 
members who have knowledge of that item before the group discussion and judgment.”
106 
Under conditions of unshared information, group judgments have been found to be “not 
any more accurate than the average of the individual judgments, even though”—and this 
is the central point—the groups were “in possession of more information than were any 
of the individuals.”
107  
In a key study, deliberating groups would have lost nothing in terms of accuracy 
if they had simply averaged the judgments of the people involved—a clear finding that 
deliberation may not improve on the judgments of statistical group.
108 The more shared 
information is (the more that it stands as “common knowledge”), the more impact it will 
have on group members before discussion begins—and the more impact it will have as 
discussion proceeds, precisely because commonly held information is more likely to be 
discussed. 
As might be expected, the group’s focus on shared information increases with the 
size of the group.
109 In another study designed to test judgments about candidates for 
office, involving both three-person and six-person groups, all discussions focused far 
more on shared information than on unshared information—but the effect was 
significantly greater for six-person groups. Most remarkably, “it was almost as likely for 
a shared item to be mentioned twice as it was for an unshared item to be mentioned at 
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all.”
110And despite the failures of their deliberations, group members were significantly 
more confident in their judgments after discussion.
111  
How can these findings be squared with the Condorcet Jury Theorem? The most 
fundamental point is that in deliberation, individuals are not making judgments on their 
own; they are being influenced by the judgments of others. When interdependent 
judgments are being made, and when some people are wrong, the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem offers no clear predictions. Under such circumstances, it is not at all clear that 
groups will do better than individuals.
112 And when groups fail, the tendency toward 
hidden profiles is often part of the reason. 
3. Informational influences and social pressures redux. Why do hidden profiles 
remain hidden? The two major explanations track the informational and social accounts 
traced above. When information is held by all or many, it is more likely, as a statistical 
matter, to be repeated in group discussion, and hence more likely to be influential than 
information that is held by one person or a few.
113 There are two different points here.
114 
Information held by all or most group members is likely to influence individual 
judgments, and those judgments will in turn affect the judgments of the group. Thus the 
effects of a shared piece of information will influence the group simply through its 
impact on predeliberation judgments. In addition, shared information, simply because it is 
shared, is more likely to be explored during group discussion. Suppose, for example, that 
a team of five lawyers is deciding whether to appeal an adverse trial court ruling. If each 
of the five lawyers shares certain information indicating that an appeal would be 
unsuccessful, that information is more likely to emerge in group discussion than separate 
parcels of information, individually held by each lawyer, suggesting that an appeal would 
likely succeed. If the team of lawyers stresses the information that is held by all, that 
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information will have a disproportionate influence on its ultimate decision.
115 This is a 
statistical point about information sampling.  
But information sampling provides an incomplete account; hidden profiles are 
even more hidden than would be predicted by that account.
116 To understand the 
additional element, consider the finding that low-status members of groups are 
“increasingly reluctant over the course of discussion to repeat unique information.”
117 
Those in a group who are inexperienced, or are thought to be low on the hierarchy, are 
particularly loathe to emphasize their privately held information as discussion proceeds. 
This finding suggests that group members, and especially lower status ones, are alert to 
the reputational costs of emphasizing information that most group members seem to lack. 
Lower status members “are likely to drop unique information like a hot potato”—partly 
because of the difficulty of establishing its credibility and relevance,
118 partly because 
they may incur group disapproval if they press a line of argument that others reject. It 
follows that hidden profiles are produced by both informational and reputational 
pressures imposed by the initial distribution of views.  
  More particularly, those who discuss shared information obtain rewards in the 
form of an enhanced sense of competence and credibility in the eyes of others—and in 
their own eyes as well.
119 In both face-to-face discussions and purely written tasks, 
people give higher ratings (in terms of knowledge, competence, and credibility) to 
themselves and to others after receiving information that they knew already. It follows 
that “a bearer of valuable, unshared information may need to establish credibility by 
telling others what they already know before telling them what they do not already 
know.”
120 The general problem is that deliberating groups often perform poorly because 
they fail to elicit information that could steer them in the right directions. 
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E. Deliberative Failure, 3: Cascades 
 
1. Informational cascades. Hidden profiles are closely related to informational 
cascades, which greatly impair group judgments. Cascades need not involve deliberation, 
but deliberative processes often involve cascades. As in the case of hidden profiles, the 
central point is that those involved in a cascade do not reveal what they know. As a 
result, the group does not obtain important information. 
To see how informational cascades work, suppose that doctors are deciding 
whether to prescribe a specified therapy for menopausal women. Let us assume that if the 
specified therapy creates significant risks of heart disease, it should not be prescribed; if 
it does not create such risks, it is worthwhile.
121 Let us also assume that the doctors are 
deciding in sequence, in some kind of temporal queue, and each doctor knows his place 
on that queue. From his own experience, each doctor has some private information about 
what should be done. But each doctor also cares, reasonably enough, about the judgments 
of others. Anderson is the first to decide. He prescribes the specified therapy if he thinks 
that the risk is low but declines if he thinks that the risk is high. Suppose that Anderson 
prescribes. Barber now knows Anderson’s judgment; it is clear that she too should 
certainly urge the specified therapy if she makes the same judgment independently. But if 
her independent judgment is that the risk is high, she would—if she trusts Anderson no 
more and no less than she trusts herself—be indifferent about whether to prescribe, and 
might simply flip a coin.  
Now turn to a third doctor, Carlton. Suppose that both Anderson and Barber have 
prescribed the specified therapy, but that Carlton’s own information, though 
inconclusive, suggests that the risk is probably high. In that event, Carlton might well 
ignore what he knows and prescribe the therapy. It is likely, in these circumstances, that 
both Anderson and Barber saw a low risk, and unless Carlton thinks that his own 
information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does, Carlton is in a 
cascade. Now suppose that Carlton is acting in response to what Anderson and Barber 
did, not on the basis of his own information, and also that subsequent doctors know what 
Anderson, Barber, and Carlton did. On reasonable assumptions, they will do exactly what 
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Carlton did: prescribe the specified therapy regardless of their private information 
(which, we are supposing, is relevant but inconclusive). This will happen even if 
Anderson blundered.
122  
If this is what is happening, there is a serious social problem: Doctors who are in 
the cascade do not disclose, to their successors and to the public, the information that 
they privately hold. In the example just given, doctors’ actions will not reflect the overall 
knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of the health consequences of the specified 
therapy—even if the information held by individual doctors, if actually revealed and 
aggregated, would give a quite accurate picture of the situation. The reason for the 
problem is that individual doctors are following the lead of those who came before. 
Subsequent doctors might fail to rely on, and fail to reveal, private information that 
actually exceeds the information collectively held by those who started the cascade. 
Hence the medical profession generally will lack information that both doctors and 
patients need to have.  
The cascade just discussed does not involve group deliberation, but it should be 
easy to see how cascades can arise during group processes, as individuals give some 
signal, through behavior, conclusion, or analysis, about what they believe. To be sure, in 
the standard informational cascade those who follow are responding to actions rather than 
to explanations or to sustained talk. At first glance, this point seems to suggest that 
cascades will occur only when people do not talk and exchange reasons. And it is 
plausible to suggest that bad cascades are less likely when people give reasons. But this 
point should not be oversold. Within deliberating groups, some efforts to give reasons are 
not much more informative than the conclusion itself. And when the explanation is both 
informative and clear clear, people might fall into a bad cascade simply because they do 
not believe that they have enough information to reject it.  
Cascades involving group processes are easy to create in the laboratory. The 
simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the experiment was using Urn A, 
which contained two red balls and one white, or Urn B, which contained two white balls 
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and one red.
123 In each period, the contents of the chosen urn were emptied in a container. 
A randomly selected subject was asked to make one (and only one) private draw of a ball. 
After that draw, the subject recorded, on an answer sheet, the color of the draw and her 
own decision about which urn was involved. The subject did not announce her draw to 
the group, but she did announce her own decision to everyone. Then the urn was passed 
to the next subject for her own private draw, which again was not disclosed, and her own 
decision about the urn, which again was disclosed. This process continued until all 
subjects had made draws and decisions. At that time the experimenter announced the 
actual urn used. Subjects could earn $2 for a correct decision. If the subject picks the urn 
based only on her private information, she will be right 66.7 percent of the time. The 
point of the experiment is to see whether people will decide to ignore their own draw in 
the face of conflicting announcements by predecessors—and to explore whether such 
decisions will lead to cascades and errors. 
In the experiment, cascades often developed and they often produced errors. After 
a number of individual judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions 
that were inconsistent with their private draw, but that fit with the majority of previous 
announcements.
124 Over 77% of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15% of private 
announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the information provided by 
people’s own draw. Consider cases in which one person’s draw (say, red) contradicted 
the announcement of his predecessor (say, Urn B). In such cases, the second 
announcement nonetheless matched the first about 11% of the time—far less than a 
majority, but enough to ensure cascades. And when one person’s draw contradicted the 
announcement of two or more predecessors, the second announcement was likely to 
follow those who went before. Notably, the majority of decisions were rationally based 
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on the available information
125—but erroneous cascades nonetheless developed. Here is 
an actual example of a cascade producing an inaccurate outcome (the urn used was B)
126: 
 
Table1: An Informational Cascade 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private  Draw  a a b b b b 
Decision  A A A A A A 
 
What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private 
information—four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, which was in 
favor of Urn B. But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect 
judgments, led everyone else to fall in line. “[I]nitial misrepresentative signals start a 
chain of incorrect decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received 
later.”
127 This result maps directly onto real-world decisions by deliberating groups, in 
which people fail to disclose what they know, to the detriment of the group as a whole. 
2. Reputational cascades. In a reputational cascade, people think that they know 
what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in 
order to maintain the good opinion of others. Suppose that Albert suggests that global 
warming is a serious problem, and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she 
actually thinks that Albert is right, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be 
ignorant or indifferent to environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree 
that global warming is a serious problem, Cynthia might not contradict them publicly and 
might even appear to share their judgment, not because she believes that judgment to be 
correct, but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose their good opinion.  
It should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, 
Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most 
reluctant to contradict them even if he thinks that they are wrong. The apparent views of 
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Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia carry information; that apparent view might be right. But 
even if David thinks that they are wrong, and has information supporting that conclusion, 
he might be most reluctant to take them on publicly. In the actual world of group 
decisions, people are of course uncertain whether publicly expressed statements are a 
product of independent knowledge, participation in an informational cascade, or 
reputational pressure. Much of the time, listeners and observers undoubtedly overstate the 
extent to which the actions of others are based on independent information. 
The possibility of reputational cascades is demonstrated by a clever variation on 
the urn experiment mentioned above.
128 In this experiment, people were paid twenty-five 
cents for a correct decision, but seventy-five cents for a decision that matched the 
decision of the majority of the group. There were punishments for incorrect and 
nonconforming answers as well. If people made an incorrect decision, they lost twenty-
five cents; if their decision failed to match the group’s decision, they lost seventy-five 
cents.  
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer than 96.7% 
of rounds resulted in cascades, and 35.3% of people’s announcements did not match their 
private signal, that is, the signal given by their own draw. And when the draw of a 
subsequent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor, 72.2% of people 
matched the first announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, this period of the 
experiment
129 (the actual urn for this period was B): 
 
Table 2: Conformity and Cascades 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Private  Draw  a b b b a b b b a b 
Decision  A A A A A A A A A A 
 
 
This experiment shows that especially unfortunate results should be expected if 
people are rewarded not only or not mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing 
what other people do. The problem is that people are not revealing the information that 
they actually have. 
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F. Deliberative Failure, 4: Group Polarization 
 
There are clear links among hidden profiles, social cascades, and the well-
established phenomenon of group polarization, by which members of a deliberating 
group end up in a more extreme position in line with their tendencies before deliberation 
began.
130 Group polarization is the typical pattern with deliberating groups. It has been 
found in hundreds of studies involving over a dozen countries, including the United 
States, France, Afghanistan, and Germany.
131 For example, those who disapprove of the 
United States, and are suspicious of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and 
suspicion if they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter 
phenomenon among citizens of France.
132 Group polarization occurs for issues of fact as 
well as issues of value, though it is easiest to demonstrate for the latter. If the question is 
whether a terrorist attack will occur in the United States in the next year, group 
polarization will not be easy to test, simply because the answer is either yes or no. But if 
the question, asked on a bounded scale, is whether a terrorist attack is likely to occur in 
the United States in the next year, the answers, from a deliberating group, will reveal 
group polarization, as people move toward more extreme points on the scale, depending 
on their initial median point.  
Why does group polarization occur? There are three reasons.
133 The first and most 
important involves the now-familiar idea of informational influence, but in a distinctive 
form. People respond to the arguments made by other people—and the “argument pool,” 
in any group with some predisposition in one direction, will inevitably be skewed toward 
that predisposition. As a statistical matter, the arguments favoring the initial position will 
be more numerous than the arguments pointing in the other direction. Individuals will 
have heard of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from group deliberation. As 
a result of the relevant arguments, deliberation will lead people toward a more extreme 
point in line with what group members initially believed. The second explanation 
involves social influences. People want to be perceived favorably by other group 
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members. Sometimes people’s publicly stated views are, to a greater or lesser extent, a 
function of how they want to present themselves. Once they hear what others believe, 
some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position, 
to hold onto their preserved self-presentation. They shift accordingly.
134 The third 
explanation stresses that people with extreme views tend to have more confidence that 
they are right, and that as people gain confidence, they become more extreme in their 
beliefs.
 135 In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s opinions have been shown 
to become more extreme simply because their view has been corroborated, and because 
they have been more confident after learning of the shared views of others.
136
Does group polarization led to accurate or inaccurate answers? Do deliberating 
groups err when they polarize? No general answer would make sense. Everything 
depends on the relationship between the correct answer and the group’s predeliberation 
tendency. But as a result of the relevant influences, some people will fail to disclose what 
they know. When polarization is involved, deliberative processes might well fail to move 
people in the right directions. When individuals are leaning in a direction that is 
erroneous, the error will be amplified by group deliberation. We have already 
encountered an example: When most people are prone to make conjunction errors, group 
processes lead to more errors rather than fewer.
137 This is polarization in action, and it 
produces major blunders. 
 
G. Deliberative Success 
 
Thus far I have emphasized several reasons why deliberation often fails to 
improve on the judgments of statistical groups, and indeed might make those judgments 
even worse. But there is some intriguing countervailing evidence. 
When one or more people in a group are confident that they know the right 
answer to a factual question, the group might be expected to shift in the direction of 
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accuracy.
138 Suppose that the question is how many people were on the earth in 1940, or 
the number of Supreme Court decisions invalidating acts of Congress, or the distance 
between Paris and London. Suppose too that one or a few people know the right answer. 
If so, there is a good chance that the group will not polarize, but instead converge on that 
answer. When this is so, the reason is simple: The person who is confident that he knows 
the answer will speak with assurance and authority, and she is likely to be convincing for 
that very reason. An early study finds that those with correct answers are usually more 
confident, and hence confidence “is associated with correctness for both individual and 
group performance.”
139 Consider in this light the finding that pairs tend to do better than 
individuals on a test involving general vocabulary knowledge; those pairs with at least 
one high-ability member generally performed at the same level as their more competent 
member.
140  
Some evidence suggests that while deliberating groups often fail to spread 
information, they are less likely to neglect unshared information if they believe that there 
is a demonstrably correct answer to the question that they are trying to answer.
141 Asked 
to solve a murder mystery, a deliberating group did far better when its members were told 
that they had sufficient clues to “determine” the identify of the guilty suspect than when 
they were told to decide which suspect was “most likely to have committed the crime.”
142 
Hence “adequate consideration of unshared, critical information during group discussion” 
appears to be affected by “how members construe their decision-making task,”
143 so that 
those who believe that they are solving a problem with a correct solution are more likely 
to explore shared information than those who think that there are reaching a consensus. It 
follows that “discussions may be more data driven and less consensus driven when 
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members believe that a demonstrably correct decision exists.”
144 Even here, however, the 
member finding the right solution requires some initial support in the group; otherwise 
the group will frequently fail.
145
An impressive study finds that groups performed exceedingly well, far better than 
individual members, in two complex tasks that had demonstrably correct solutions.
146 
The first involved a statistical problem, requiring subjects to guess the composition of an 
urn containing blue balls and red balls. The second involved a problem in monetary 
policy, asking participants to manipulate the interest rate to steer the economy in good 
directions. People were asked to perform as individuals and in groups. The basic results 
for the two experiments were similar. Groups significantly outperformed individuals. On 
a scale of 1-100, the average group score in the urn test was 86.8, as opposed to 83.7 for 
individuals—a highly significant difference statistically. For the monetary policy 
problem, the difference was essentially identical. Interesting, groups did not, on balance, 
take longer to make decision. In terms of both accuracy and time, there were no 
differences between group decisions made with a unanimity requirement and group 
decisions made by majority rule.  
How can these results be explained? An obvious possibility is that group 
processes play a little role and that the group’s discussion is simply the average of 
individual judgments. On this view, the judgments of these deliberating groups simply 
were statistical judgments. But the evidence is inconsistent with this hypothesis; groups 
did far better than their average member. Even more remarkably, the performance of the 
median player did not explain the performance of the group. An alternative hypothesis is 
that each group contained one or more strong analysts, who were able to move the group 
in the right direction. But in the experiments, there is little support for this hypothesis. “In 
the end, we are left to conclude that neither the average player, nor the median player, not 
the best player determine the decisions of the group.” It seems that in these experiments, 
the better decisions by groups resulted from the fact that the best points and arguments 
turned out to spread among the various individual players. Here we find some basis for 
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the claim that under appropriate conditions, groups can do much better than 
individuals.
147 The relevant conditions appear to include highly competent group 
members attempting to solve statistical problems that all members knew to have 
demonstrably correct answers.  
 
IV.  Remedies and Correctives 
 
How might group performance be improved? How can groups counteract the 
problems I have emphasized? If the problem consists of informational and reputational 
pressure, then the solution is to take steps to elicit the information that people actually 
have. The most difficult problem is the propagation of error. If group members use the 
availability heuristic, or if they fall prey to optimistic bias, blunders will result unless 
they are corrected by one or more group members. Even here, the best solution is to 
attempt to ensure that group members disclose what they know.  
But for those who seek to diminish the effects of informational pressure and 
social influences, there is a cautionary note. We can imagine groups that actually benefit 
from both of these, and hence from cascades and polarization. Sometimes it is good for 
people to silence themselves; sometimes their contributions would be unhelpful, because 
what they believe that they know is false.
148 If some group members have a bad idea 
about how to stabilize the economy, litigate a case, or reduce the threat of terrorism, 
informational pressure and social influences might make them defer to those who know 
much better. As a result, the group will do better rather than worse. 
We have seen that polarization might lead people in the right direction; the 
question is whether a more extreme version of members’ antecedent tendency is correct, 
and that question must be answered on its merits. The process of polarization does not 
provide that answer. Or consider a cascade in which the early movers actually know the 
truth, and those who follow them are ignoring private information that they believe to be 
true but that would, on reflection, turn out to be erroneous or misleading. If so, the 
followers are not only rational in disregarding what they know; they also lead the group 
in a better direction because they do not give it bad signals. Those who participate in 
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cascades are acting rationally, but the more important point is that if those who start 
cascades are correct, both individuals and groups are better off as a result. The only 
problem—and it is a serious one—is that many cascade participants will fail to disclose 
accurate information, and for that reason the group will suffer, as demonstrated by the 
experiments discussed above.  
The overriding question is how to alter people’s incentives, so as to ensure that 
people will say what they actually know. Many possibilities might be imagined here.  
 
A.  Predeliberation Anonymity: Secret Ballots and the Delphi Method 
 
People might be asked to register their opinions anonymously, either in advance 
of deliberation or after it has occurred. The secret ballot can be understood as an effort to 
insulate people from reputational pressures and to permit them to say what they 
believe.
149 Many institutions should consider more use of the secret ballot simply to elicit 
more information. 
Consider the Delphi Technique, which has several key features.
150 First, it ensures 
the anonymity of all members through a self-administered questionnaire. The purpose of 
anonymity is precisely “to diminish the effects of social pressures, as from dominant or 
dogmatic individuals, or from a majority.”
151 Second, it is iterated, and there is a system 
for controlled feedback on the judgments of others. Members make individual estimates; 
all members are informed of the views of other members; and there are additional rounds 
of estimates, allowing feedback until there is a desired level of convergence. Third, group 
members are permitted to communicate, but sometimes only their ultimate conclusions 
(generally in the form of summary statistics involving quartiles or ranges); and typically 
the conclusions, given anonymously, are provided to others by a facilitator or monitor 
team, often in the form of a simple summary such as a mean of median value of the group 
response. Thus “the feedback comprises the opinions and judgments of all group 
members and not just the most vocal.”
152 (Note here that the Delphi Method is most 
successful when group members are provided not only with the mean or median estimate, 
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but also with reasons given by group members for their views.
153 An account of reasons 
is most likely to move people in the correct directions.
154) Fourth, and finally, the 
judgments of group members are subject to a statistical aggregation.  
The Delphi Method provides a sharp contrast with efforts to obtain the judgments 
of statistical groups and also with interacting groups containing open deliberation. And in 
several contexts, the Delphi Method has provided more accuracy than open discussion.
155 
For general almanac questions, the Delphi Method was found to produce better answers 
than individual estimates, though open discussion did still better, apparently because it 
served to correct errors.
156 A natural alternative to the Delphi Method would be a system 
in which ultimate judgments were stated anonymously, but only after deliberation. 
Anonymity would insulate group members from reputational pressure, and to that extent 
could reduce the problem of self-silencing. But it would do little to reduce informational 
pressure. 
 
B. Roles, Experts, and Forewarning 
 
Imagine a deliberating group consisting of people with specific roles, appreciated 
and known by all group members. One person might be understood to have medical 
expertise; a second might be a lawyer; a third might know about public relations; a fourth 
might be a statistician. In such a group, it might be hypothesized that sensible information 
aggregation would be far more likely, simply because each member knows that each 
other has something particular to contribute. Hidden profiles should be less likely to 
remain hidden if there is a strict division of labor, in which each person is 
knowledgeable, and known to be knowledgeable, about something in particular.
157
Several experiments support the hypothesis.
158 In one such experiment, each 
member of a three-person group was given a good deal of information about one of three 
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candidates for office.
159 In half of these groups, the “expertise” of each member was 
publicly identified to all before discussion began; in half of them, there was no such 
public identification of experts. The bias in favor of shared information was substantially 
reduced in those groups in which experts were publicly identified as such.
160 The 
reduction of the bias was significantly smaller when there was no public identification of 
experts and when each group member was simply told, by the experimenter, that he or 
she was an expert on a particular candidate.
161 The lesson is clear: If a group seeks to 
obtain the information that its members hold, it would make sense to inform all group 
members, before deliberation begins, that different members have different, and relevant, 
information to contribute. Unfortunately, however, the effect of role assignment, in 
reducing hidden profiles, is not huge.
162
 
C. Devil’s Advocates 
 
If hidden profiles and self-silencing are the source of group failure, then an 
obvious response is to ask some group members to act as “devil’s advocates,” urging a 
position that is contrary to the group’s inclination.
163 This was a central suggestion of 
both the Senate Committee reporting on intelligences failures in connection with Iraq and 
of the review board that investigated large blunders at NASA.
164  
Those assuming the role of devil’s advocates will not occur the reputational 
pressure that comes from rejecting the dominant position within the group; they have 
been requested to do precisely that. And because they are asked to take a contrary 
position, they are freed from the informational influences that can lead to self-silencing. 
Hidden profiles are less likely to remain hidden if one or more group members are told to 
disclose the information they have, even if that information runs contrary to the apparent 
tendency within the group. In at least one well-known case, this approach appeared to 
work. “During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy gave his brother, the Attorney 
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General, the unambiguous mission of playing devil’s advocate, with seemingly excellent 
results in breaking up a premature consensus.”
165
Unfortunately, research on devil’s advocacy in small groups does not provide 
conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of devil’s advocacy in real-world settings.
166 To 
be sure, many experimenters have found that protection of genuine dissenting views can 
enhance group performance.
167 But a formal requirement of devil’s advocacy enhances 
group performance far less than does the articulation of genuine dissent. When an 
advocate’s challenges to a group consensus are insincere, members discount his 
arguments accordingly. At best, he merely facilitates a “multisided examination of the 
problems at hand.”
168 Because devil’s advocates have no incentive to sway the group’s 
members to their side, they accomplishes their task if they allows the consensus view to 
refute the unpopular dissenting arguments. Unlike a genuine dissenter, the devil’s 
advocate has little to gain by zealously challenging the dominant view and as a result, 
tends not to persist in challenging the group consensus.
169 In any case the perceived 
sincerity of a dissenter is an important factor in determining minority influence.
170 An 
insincere devil’s advocate is unlikely to provide much help. 
 
D. Enlisting High-Status Contrarians—and Leadership 
 
Some people are more likely to silence themselves than others. For example, 
group members are less likely to conform if they have high social status or are extremely 
confident about their own views.
171 In a complementary finding, members of low status 
groups—less educated people, African-Americans, sometimes women—have been 
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shown to carry less influence within deliberating groups than their higher-status peers.
172 
Creative groups would do well to exploit these findings.  
For example, the problem of unshared information is reduced when that 
information is held by a leader within a group; not surprisingly, the leader’s words count, 
and people listen to have leaders have to say.
173 In a leading experiment, a medical team 
consisting of a resident physician, an intern, and a third-year medical student showed a 
tendency to repeat unshared items emphasized by the resident.
174 More generally, those 
experienced in the task at hand are more likely to mention and to repeat unshared 
information.
175 One reason for these effects is that those with higher status or competence 
are less subject to the reputational pressures that come from emphasizing unshared 
information.
176 Another reason is that leaders and experts are more likely to think that 
their own information is accurate and worth disclosing to the group, notwithstanding the 
fact that the information held by other group members cuts in the other direction.  
The simplest lesson is that leaders and high-status members can do groups a large 
service by asserting a contrary view, at least for purposes of argument.
177 In a similar 
vein, group leaders should be reluctant to state a firm view at the outset and should thus 
allow space for more information to emerge.  
 
E. Restructured Incentives, 1: Money 
 
How would groups perform if individuals knew that they would be rewarded, not 
if their own answer was correct, but if the majority of the group was correct? We might 
speculate that in a situation of this kind, hidden profiles and cascades would be 
dramatically reduced. The reason is that when people are rewarded when their group is 
right, they are far more likely to reveal, to that group, what they actually know. 
                                                 
172 See Caryn Christenson and Ann Abbott, Team Medical Decision Making, in Decision Making in Health 
Care (Gretchen Chapman and Frank Sonnenberg eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 
267, 273-76. 
173 Stasser, Unshared Information, supra note, at 65.  
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Cf. Janis, supra note, at 262-63 (emphasizing the need for leaders to be willing to accept criticism of his 
or her own judgments). 
41  
For supportive evidence, consider an intriguing variation on the urn experiment, 
where subjects were paid $2 for a correct group decision and penalized $2 for an 
incorrect group decision, with the group decision determined by majority rule.
178 People 
were neither rewarded nor punished for a correct individual decision. The result was that 
in 92% of cases, people’s announcement matched their private draw. And because people 
revealed their private signals, the system of majority rule produced a huge increase in 
fully informed decisions—that is, the outcomes that someone would reach if he were 
somehow able to see all private information held by group members. As an example, 
consider this period from the majority rule experiment
179 (the actual urn was A): 
 
Table 3: No cascade 
 
             
Private  Draw a a a a b a a a b   
Decision  A A A A B A A A B   
 
What is the explanation for this significantly reduced level of cascades in a 
system of majority rule? The answer lies in the fact that the individual knows that he has 
nothing to gain from a correct individual decision and everything to gain from a correct 
group decision. As a result, it is in the individual’s interest to say exactly what he sees, 
because it is the accurate announcement, from each person, that is most likely to promote 
an accurate group decision. A simple way to understand this point is to assume that a 
group has a large number of members and that each member makes an announcement 
that matches his private draw. As a statistical matter, it is overwhelmingly likely that the 
majority’s position will be correct.  
The sophisticated participants in this experiment, from the California Institute of 
Technology, saw the point; perhaps other participants would not, and hence the result 
might not be generalizable. But we could imagine institutional design that would increase 
the likelihood that people would disclose what they know, so as to reduce the 
informational and reputational pressures imposed by the expressed views of others. 
Institutional leaders might reward people for disclosing information that is held by only a 
few; they might make clear, in advance, that departures from the prevailing wisdom are 
                                                 
178 Plott and Huang at 1511. 
179 Id. at 1515. 
42  
welcome. Approaches of this kind would increase the likelihood that hidden profiles 
would come to the attention of the group as a whole. 
 
F. Restructured Incentives, 2: Norms 
 
Self-silencing is partly a product of social norms—of a sense that people will be 
punished, rather than rewarded, for disclosing information that departs from the group’s 
inclination. It should be easy to see that groups can aggravate or eliminate this effect. If 
consensus is prized, and known to be prized, then self-silencing will be more likely. If the 
group is known to welcome new and competing information, then the reward structure 
will be fundamentally different. Evidence for this claim comes from experiments that 
“primed” people by asking them to engage in a prior task that involved either “getting 
along” or “critical thinking.” Primed by a task that called for critical thinking, people 
were far more likely to disclose what they know, and there was a quite substantial effect 
on hidden profiles.
180 The general lesson is that if norms favor disclosure of privately 
held information, then self-silencing will be significantly reduced; deliberation is likely to 
benefit as a result. 
 
V. Information Markets  
 
   Deliberation is one way to aggregate the information held by group members; 
another way is to rely on the price signal, which has a similar aggregative function.
181 
And if an emphasis is placed on the information-aggregating properties of markets, it 
would seem plain that if we are attempting to improve on the answer produced by 
statistical means and deliberating groups, we might consider an increasingly popular 
possibility: Create a market.
182  
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The advantage of this approach is that it imposes the right incentives for people to 
disclose the information that they hold. Because investments are generally not disclosed 
to the public, investors need not fear reputational sanctions if, for example, they have 
predicted that a company’s sales will be low or that a certain candidate will be elected 
president. And because people stand to gain or lose from their investments, they have a 
strong incentive to use (and in that sense to disclose) whatever private information they 
hold. Of course investors, like everyone else, are subject to the informational pressure 
imposed by the views of others. But a market creates strong incentives for revelation of 
whatever information people actually hold.  
 
A. Practice and Evidence 
 
In many imaginable markets, people might make claims about facts, or 
predictions about the future, and they might stand to gain or lose from their predictions. 
In the summer of 2003, in fact, analysts at the Department of Defense built directly on 
this idea.
183 To predict important events in the world, including terrorist attacks, they 
sought to create a kind of market in which ordinary people could actually place bets. The 
proposed Policy Analysis Market would have allowed people to invest in their 
predictions about such matters as the growth of the Egyptian economy, the death of 
Yassir Arafat, the military withdrawal of the United States from specified nations, and 
the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the United States. Investors would have won or lost 
money on the basis of the accuracy of their predictions.  
Predictably, the Policy Analysis Market produced a storm of criticism. Ridiculed 
as “offensive” and “useless,” the proposal was abandoned. Senator Tom Daschle called 
the market “a plan to trade in death” and boldly claimed that the plan was “the most 
irresponsible, outrageous and poorly thought-out of anything that I have heard the 
administration propose to date."
184 Senator Byron Dorgan argued that “it is morally 
bankrupt for a government agency to make a profitable game out of the deaths of 
American troops, heads of state, and nuclear missile attacks.”
185 A private Policy 
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Analysis Market, specializing in the Middle East, was promised in 2003, but it did not go 
forward.
186
Amid the war on terrorism, why was the Defense Department so interested in the 
Policy Analysis Market? The answer is simple: it wanted to have some help in predicting 
geopolitical events, including those that would endanger American interests, and it 
believed that a market would provide that help. It speculated that if a large number of 
people could be given an incentive to aggregate their private information, in the way that 
the Policy Analysis Market would do, government officials would learn a great deal. 
Apparently it believed that such a market would provide an important supplement to 
deliberative processes within government and without.
187
Does this idea seem fanciful? Since 1988, the University of Iowa has run the Iowa 
Electronic Markets (IEM), which allow people to bet on the outcome of presidential 
elections. Originally the IEM allowed people to trade only in the expected fraction of the 
popular vote to be obtained by presidential candidates.
188 Securities were offered that 
would pay $ 2.50 multiplied by the specified candidate’s share of the vote. If, for 
example, Bush received 50% of the vote, then the shareholder would receive $1.25. 
Shares could be bought and sold until the day before the election. Since their opening, the 
IEM have expanded from these humble roots. Today, traders can bet on the market 
capitalization that Google will achieve in its initial public offering, the price of Microsoft 
stock at a future date, and Federal Reserve monetary policy, in addition to betting on 
American elections.
189
For presidential elections—still the most popular markets that IEM operates—
traders can now choose from two types of markets.
190 In a “winner-take-all” market, 
traders win $1 for each future in the winning candidate that they own and nothing for 
shares of the losing candidate. In a “vote-share” market, traders in “candidate futures” 
win $1 multiplied by the proportion of the popular vote that the candidate received.
191 
                                                 
186 For a replicate of the site, see http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/linkscopy/PAM/ 
187 See Wolfers and Zizewitz, supra note. 
188 See Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets (July 2003 working 
paper). 
189 See http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/markets/ 
190 See id. 
191 Robert Forsythe, Thomas Rietz, & Thomas Ross, Wishes, Expectations, and Actions: A Survey on Price 
Formation in Election Stock Markets, 39 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 83, 85 (1999). 
45  
Thus, in a winner-take-all market, a Dukakis future was worth nothing after the election, 
while in a vote-share market, each Dukakis future paid $0.456. In a winner-take-all 
market, the market price reflects traders’ perception of the likelihood that each candidate 
will win the election. Similarly, observers can use the prices in a vote-share market much 
as they might use a poll. These prices are the market’s estimate of each candidate’s likely 
share of the vote when the election occurs. In each case, the market price reflects the 
aggregate information held by participants in the market. 
The IEM operate much like an ordinary stock market. To enter the market, each 
participant must purchase “unit portfolios” consisting of one future in each candidate for 
each dollar that the trader puts into the market.
192 Once she has bought enough of these 
“unit portfolios,” she can unbundle the contracts and trade individual shares. All trading 
is fully computerized and traders must reach the markets through the Internet.
193 Unlike 
most stock exchanges, the IEM does not allow speculators to sell futures short. 
Nevertheless, as in a typical stock market, traders can issue bids and asks (limit orders) or 
accept outstanding offers (market orders). While most traders merely accept market 
orders rather than choosing their own prices, a small group of “marginal traders” trade 
frequently and post limit orders.
194 It is these traders who have the greatest effect on 
prices, as we shall see. 
As a predictor, the Iowa Electronic Markets have produced extraordinarily 
accurate judgments. Most of the time, it has done better than professional polling 
organizations.
195 In the week before the last four elections, the predictions in the Iowa 
market have shown an average absolute error of just 1.5 percentage points, a significant 
improvement over the 2.1 percentage point error in the final Gallop polls.
196 The Iowa 
market has proved accurate not only on election eve but only in long forecasting 
horizons, both in absolute terms and also when compared to alternative forecasting 
systems.
197 In Australia, betting on local races has proved extremely accurate.
198 In other 
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nations, universities are operating markets about elections; examples include the 
University of British Columbia Election stock market, involving Canada,
199 and Vienna 
University of Technology, operating the Austrian Electronic Market.
200 Although the 
relevant districts are quite small, Australian bookmakers have shown a high degree of 
accuracy in predicting district-level races.
201
Or consider the Hollywood Stock Exchange, in which people predict Oscar 
nominees and winners (as well as opening weekend box office successes). For the 
Hollywood Stock Exchange, the level of accuracy has been impressive. “HSX offers 
good predictions of a film's gross receipts before release and, relatively speaking, even 
better predictions after opening weekend - when a large number of traders have some 
information in the form of (or at least the possibility of) observing the finished film on 
screen, along with audience reactions. Apparently, studios have begun relying on these 
estimates to structure the distribution of their films.”
202 The market has proved at least 
equal to expert panels in predicting Oscar winners, with (for example) correct predictions 
of thirty-five of forty Oscar nominees in 2002.
203  
The futures market for oranges does a better job predicting weather in Florida 
than the National Weather Service.
204 A large prediction market, producing a typical 
event turnover in the hundreds of millions of dollars and run by the Deutsche Bank and 
Goldman Sacks, involves the likelihood that economic data released later in the week will 
show specific values
205; the market performs about as well as the consensus forecasts of a 
survey of about fifty professional forecasters.
206 Companies have started to use internal 
prediction markets to answer relevant questions, including likely sales in specific 
periods.
207 The level of accuracy here is also high—far better, in fact, than what would 
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emerge from statistical means or deliberation, where excessive optimism can cause 
serious problems.
208  
For example, Hewlett Packard (HP) and the California Institute of Technology 
initiated a project to study experimental markets as an information aggregation 
mechanism involving product sales.
209 The experimenters chose twelve people who 
worked in different parts of HP’s business operation. Because of its small size, the market 
was a very “thin” one, meaning that there were few participants and that the market was 
far less liquid than the much “thicker” Iowa Electronic Markets. Participants were chosen 
with the thought that each could contribute information from his department in buying 
and selling the relevant futures, which were tied to sales and bonuses for executives 
(which, in turn, are closely tied to profits). The markets were organized so that that 
securities existed for intervals of sales. For example, one security would pay off if sales 
were between one and ten printers; another would pay off if sales were between 10 and 
20. In most of the experiments, the possible range of sales was divided into ten intervals 
of equal size. On the basis the prices of each security, the experimenters could guess how 
many units HP would sell that month. 
        The results showed that the markets’ predictions were a considerable 
improvement over HP’s official forecast. In six of the eight markets for which official 
forecasts were available, the market prediction was closer to the actual outcome than the 
official forecast
210—and this was despite “anecdotal evidence” that the markets’ activities 
were included as inputs in generating the official forecast.
211  
In fact prediction markets are springing up all over the Internet, allowing people 
to make bets on the likely outcomes of sports, entertainment, finance, and political 
events. In fact we can find actual or proposed prediction markets about any number of 
questions: Will gas prices reach $3 per gallon? Will cellular life be found on Mars? Will 
Osama Bin Laden be captured by a certain date? Will small pox return to the United 
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States? Will there be a sequel to Master and Commander? Will the Federal 
Communications Commission be abolished? Consider the following list: 
 
•  Hollywood Stock Exchange— http://www.hsx.com 
•  Austrian Electronic Markets--http://ebweb.tuwien.ac.at/apsm/ 
•  University of British Columbia Election Stock Market--http://esm.ubc.ca/ 
•  Iowa Electronic Markets—http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ 
•  Foresight Exchange—http://www.ideosphere.com/fx/ 
•  Tradesports—http://www.tradesports.com 
•  Centrebet-- http://www.centrebet.com/ 
•  News Futures--http://us.newsfutures.com/home/home.html 
•  Probability Sports—http://www.probabilitysports.com 
•  Economic Derivatives—http://www.economicderivatives.com 
•  Wahlstreet—German political futures market; 
http://tagesspiegel.wahlstreet.de/share/home/home.html 
 
All in all, prediction markets have been spectacularly successful in terms of the 
aggregate accuracy of the resulting “prices.” Why is this? Note that they do not rely on 
the median or average judgment of a randomly selected group of people. They are 
genuine markets. Those who participate are self-selected. They must believe that they 
have relevant information; it is costly for them to “vote,” and they ought not to be 
expected to do so unless they have something to gain.
212 In addition, votes are not 
weighted equally. If people want to invest a few dollars, they are permitted to do so, but 
they can invest a great deal more if they are confident of their answer.
213 Intensity of 
conviction is captured in prices.  
There is a further point. People are permitted to buy and sell shares on a 
continuing basis. “Unlike polls or expert panels in which participants are asked for their 
independent opinions, each trader in the market sees the net effects of the beliefs of all 
other traders, and the time series changes in those beliefs. This makes the market more 
than a static, one-time prediction but rather a dynamic system that can respond 
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instantaneously to the arrival of new information.”
214 Moreover, a correct answer is 
rewarded and an incorrect one is punished. Hence investors have a strong incentive to be 
right. In these circumstances, accurate answers can emerge even if only a small 
percentage of participants have good information. In the Iowa Electronic Markets, for 
example, it turns out that 85% of the traders do not seem to be particularly wise.
215 They 
hold onto their shares for a long period and then simply accept someone else’s prices. 
The predictions of the market are driven by the other 15%—frequent traders who post 
their offers rather than accepting those made by other people. To work well, prediction 
markets do not require accurate judgments by anything like the majority of 
participants.
216 In this sense, information markets are very different from the ordinary 
judgments of groups.  
How might institutions take advantage of information markets? We can imagine 
both internal and public varieties. An internal market would be limited to people within 
the relevant organization. As we have seen, Hewlitt-Packard has used such a market to 
predict sales, and the Department of Defense proposed an internal Policy Analysis 
Market as part of its abandoned initiative on geopolitical events.
217 In either case, the 
outcome of the market might well be more accurate than the outcome of deliberation, in 
which errors might arise and be propagated as a result of discussion. (For companies, 
optimistic bias is an obvious risk,
218 one that information markets should reduce.) An 
organization might rely on an internal market if it seeks to keep the results private or if it 
believes that an aggregation of information held within the organization will be 
sufficiently accurate. One risk of an internal market is that it might be too “thin”; another 
is that members of the organization might suffer from a systematic bias. Alternatively, an 
institution might create a public market, available to all, believing that through this route 
it will obtain more accurate results. In either case, an organization might use an 
information market instead of group deliberation, or at the very least as an input into such 
deliberation. 
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B. Failed Predictions? 
 
  In what circumstances might information markets fail? To answer this question, 
ordinary stock markets are the place to start. As in ordinary markets, a primary concern is 
that these markets can be susceptible to manipulation by powerful speculators. The only 
known attempt to manipulate a prediction market occurred during the 2000 presidential 
election. A group of speculators mounted an attack on the Iowa Electronic Market by 
buying large volumes of futures in Patrick Buchanan. The value of Buchanan share did 
increase dramatically, but then fell almost immediately when “well-informed traders ... 
seized the opportunity to profit off the manipulative traders.”
219 Hence the Iowa market 
remained stable despite this attempted manipulation. Perhaps other, more plausible 
efforts at manipulation would succeed; but none has thus far. 
Another concern is that some of the cognitive biases that afflict individuals will 
manifest themselves in prediction markets. Just as in group deliberation, investors in a 
market might be subject to predictable heuristics and biases. The results here are 
unequivocal: they are. Psychologists have found that people overestimate the likelihood 
that their preferred candidate will win an election—a form of optimistic bias.
220 For 
example, at a certain point in the 1980 campaign, 87% of Jimmy Carter’s supporters 
believed that he would win, while 80% of Ronald Reagan’s supporters believed that their 
candidate would win.
221 Obviously, at least one side had overestimated its candidate’s 
probability of victory at that point.  
In the market context, IEM traders show the same bias. In 1988, for example, 
Dukakis supporters were more likely to hold futures in the Massachusetts governor’s ill-
fated presidential bid than were supporters of George Bush.
222 More strikingly still, 
Dukakis supporters were more likely to view the candidates’ debates as helpful to the 
Democratic candidate and accordingly bought significant additional futures in his 
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campaign after each debate.
223 Bush supporters showed the same pattern. Traders clearly 
exhibited the “assimilation-contrast” effect.
224 People usually assimilate new information 
in a way that confirms their view of the world.  
   Despite these biases, the Iowa Electronic Markets were more accurate than most polls 
in predicting the outcome of the 1988 presidential election. Even three weeks before the 
election, the market provided an almost-perfect guess for the candidates’ shares of the 
vote.
225 How is this result possible when many traders showed the relevant biases? The 
answer lies in the behavior of a small group of “marginal traders” who were far less 
susceptible to these biases—the “marginal trader” hypothesis. In this view, a small group 
of traders who are less susceptible to these biases have a much greater effect on aggregate 
market behavior. In trading election futures, these traders did not show the same biases as 
their fellow traders and earned significant profits at the expense of their less rational 
colleagues.
226 Thus, the biased behavior of most traders did not affect the market price 
because the marginal traders were prepared to take advantage of their blunders. If 
marginal traders are active and able to profit from the bounded rationality of other 
participants, then there will be no effect on the aggregate market price.
227
     Another bias that might be expected to affect prediction markets is the “favorite-
longshot” bias often seen in horse races. In horse-racing, heavy favorites tend to give 
higher returns than other horses in the field, while longshots tend to offer lower than 
expected returns.
228 If the point generalizes, prediction markets might not be accurate 
with respect to highly unlikely events. The market should be expected to overestimate 
their likelihood; for example, Pat Buchanan futures would be expected to be (and might 
well have been) overpriced even before the attempted manipulation of the market. By 
contrast, a prediction market might underestimate the probability of events that are highly 
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likely to occur.
229 But on existing prediction markets, there is little evidence of systematic 
errors in this vein. 
 “Prediction bubbles” are also easy to imagine, with investors moving in a certain 
direction with the belief that many other investors are doing the same. A temporary 
upsurge in investment in the nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton as 2004 Democratic 
nominee might well have been a small bubble, with some investors thinking, not that she 
would in fact be the nominee, but that others would invest in that judgment, thus inflating 
the value of the investment Crashes are possible as well. In any case informational 
influences can certainly lead individuals to make foolish investments in any market, 
including prediction markets.
230  
In particular contexts, the problems are worse still. Consider the problem of 
“terrorism futures.” It would be extremely valuable to aggregate privately held 
information about the risk and location of any attack. But do likely investors actually 
possible helpful information? Thomas Rietz, a director of the Iowa Electronic Markets, 
argued that terrorism and world events were fundamentally different from other contexts 
in which markets have successfully predicted future events.
231 When betting on 
presidential elections, people can use their network of friends, family, and co-workers to 
form an opinion; but there are no such sources of information for terrorist activity. 
Another skeptic worried that the market would allow the wealthy to “hedge” against the 
possibility of terrorist activity, while ordinary Americans would remain vulnerable to this 
threat.
232 In this view, the “terrorism futures” market could operate as an insurance 
market that would not serve its purpose of providing information. In any event 
government use of the resulting information could be self-defeating, at least if the 
information were made public. Terrorists would know the anticipated time and location 
of attacks, and also know that the government was aware of this—which would make it 
most unlikely that the prediction would turn out to be accurate. Where the event’s 
occurrence is endogenous to the outcome of the information market, there is reason for 
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skepticism about its likely performance, certainly if relevant actors have much to lose if 
the market turns out to be correct.
233  
But many policy issues, including those potentially involved in the now-defunct 
Policy Analysis Market, did not have this feature. Consider, for example, the question 
whether the Egyptian economy is likely to grow in the next year, or whether Yassir 
Arafat will lead the Palestinian Authority by the end of 2005. Perhaps many investors 
will lack a great deal of information on such questions, but it is most unlikely that the 
market prediction will turn out to be self-defeating. The Policy Analysis Market itself 
raises many questions and doubts. But the broader points is that in many domains, 
information markets are extremely promising, and likely to outperform both statistical 
means and the products of group deliberation. At a minimum, such markets should be 
used, where feasible, as an adjunct to deliberative processes. 
 
VI.  Normative Questions and Group Judgments 
 
Deliberating groups are often asked to answer questions that are not purely 
factual. Issues involving morality, politics, and law require assessment of normative 
issues. Should cost-benefit analysis be the foundation of regulatory decisions? Should the 
minimum wage be increased? Should capital punishment be permitted? Can the President 
be impeached for lying under oath? Should Roe v. Wade be overruled? Should the 
Constitution be interpreted to require states to reconsider same-sex marriages? When, if 
ever, is theft morally acceptable?  
When people answer such questions, informational influences and social 
pressures are likely to play a major role. One study demonstrates group polarization with 
respect to outrage: When individuals are outraged about corporate misconduct, juries are 
systematically more outraged than their median member.
234 And in fact group discussion 
often produces polarization on normative issues,
235 in a way that strongly suggests the 
presence of hidden profiles. It is on normative questions, above all, the groups end up at a 
more extreme point in line with their predeliberation tendencies. I have noted that in 
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many domains, federal judges are subject to group polarization, with both Democratic 
and Republican appointees showing a tendency to extremism when they are sitting with 
like-minded others.
236 It might be controversial to suggest that groups propagate 
individual errors, because in the normative domain, we might not be able to say, with 
confidence, that one or another view counts as an “error.” But if individual errors do 
occur, group errors will occur as well. As obvious examples, consider the persistence of 
slavery and racial segregation. As a less obvious example, consider framing. The framing 
of options affects judgments not only on factual questions but on moral ones as well, 
including for example the disputed issue of moral obligations to members of future 
generations.
237 As noted, groups do not show less susceptibility to framing effects than 
individuals,
238 and hence groups will be vulnerable to framing for questions of morality 
and law as well as for questions of fact. 
No information market could be helpful in answering normative questions, simply 
because there is no way to know whether a particular investor has been shown to be 
correct.
239 And for normative questions, it might seem odd or perhaps even bizarre to rely 
on the judgments of statistical groups. To be sure, democratic processes might be seen as 
an effort to settle moral and political issues by seeking the mean view within the relevant 
population. But to say the least, it is controversial to claim that ordinarily moral and 
political questions are best answered by simply finding the mean views of a population-
wide sample. (Is the morality of abortion, or capital punishment. properly assessed by 
asking for the average view of a group of, say, 1000 people?) Note, however, that 
empirical questions are often a central component of good answers to normative 
problems, at least on a certain view about how to think about problems of this kind, and if 
this is so, then the analysis of group mistakes should play to those components of group 
assessments of normative questions.  
Consider, for example, the suggestion that the minimum wage should be 
increased. If minimum wage increases would significantly decrease employment, surely 
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that is relevant to the decision whether to support such increases; and it matters too 
whether minimum wage increases would benefit poor people or mostly people who are 
not poor.
240 Now these are empirical question on which experts are almost certainly far 
better than deliberating groups of ordinary people. But many normative questions cannot 
sensibly be resolved without information about the effects of one or another answer. The 
argument for making cost-benefit analysis the foundation of regulatory decisions must 
turn, in part, on the effects of doing so. The consequences of overruling Roe v. Wade 
should probably matter to the decision whether that precedent should be overruled; if the 
result would be to increase dangerous, unlawful abortions, courts should, on a sensible 
view of the normative question, be reluctant to overrule it even if they would otherwise 
be inclined to do so.  
Of course consequences may not be the central part of a normative dispute, and 
indeed it is difficult even to know how to evaluate or even to describe consequences 
without some kind of normative view. But the more general point nonetheless holds: 
Sometimes a certain view of the facts can bring diverse people into line on normative 
issues, producing a single position despite disagreements on those issues. To this extent, 
the analysis here applies to normative questions as well. Group judgments on such 
questions will be distorted by hidden profiles, the propagation of errors, and self-
silencing. It is important to take steps, of the kind that I have catalogued, to reduce those 
distortions. 
What about for purely normative issues, lacking any factual component? Here the 
argument on behalf of group deliberation is not fundamentally different from what it is 
elsewhere.
241 Unless we are skeptics, we will agree that one point of deliberation is to 
ensure that normative questions are correctly answered, that is, are answered by reference 
to good reasons, even if we disagree about what they are. And if this is so, then there is 
strong reason to be concerned, for normative questions no less than empirical ones, that 
group judgments will be impaired by the mechanisms traced here. The structural reforms 
have an equivalent role in the normative domain. 
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Conclusion 
 
Groups often contain a great deal of information, and an important task is to elicit 
and use the information that members actually have. Deliberation is generally thought to 
be the best way of carrying out that task. But deliberative bodies are subject to serious 
problems. Much of the time, informational influences and social pressures lead members 
not to say what they know. As a result, groups tend to propagate and even to amplify 
cognitive errors. They also emphasize shared information at the expense of unshared 
information; hidden profiles are a result. Cascade effects and group polarization are 
common. 
What can be done by way of response? At the very least, it should be possible to 
structure deliberation so as to increase the likelihood that relevant information will 
emerge. Institutions might ensure anonymity and private polling before deliberation; they 
might permit anonymous statements of final conclusions; they might create strong 
incentives, economic and otherwise, to encourage people to disclose what they know. 
Information markets might supplement or replace group deliberation. Because they 
provide economic rewards for correct individual answers, they are often more accurate 
than the judgments of deliberating groups. To the extent feasible, the latter would often 
do well to enlist information markets in arriving at their judgments.  
My emphasis throughout has been on the aggregation of information and the risk 
that deliberating groups will err on instrumental questions and on issues of fact. But the 
same risk arises in the normative domain, where informational influences and social 
pressures also produce forms of self-silencing that are highly damaging to good 
deliberation. In that domain as elsewhere, incentives make all the difference; well-
functioning groups take steps to ensure that on normative questions as on factual ones, 
people feel free to disclose what they believe to be true. 
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